We study infinite stochastic games played by two-players over a finite state space, with objectives specified by sets of infinite traces. The games are concurrent (players make moves simultaneously and independently), stochastic (the next state is determined by a probability distribution that depends on the current state and chosen moves of the players) and infinite (proceeds for infinite number of rounds). The analysis of concurrent stochastic games can be classified into: quantitative analysis, analyzing the optimum value of the game and ε-optimal strategies that ensure values within ε of the optimum value; and qualitative analysis, analyzing the set of states with optimum value 1 and ε-optimal strategies for the states with optimum value 1. We consider concurrent games with tail objectives, i.e., objectives that are independent of the finite-prefix of traces, and show that the class of tail objectives are strictly richer than the ω-regular objectives. We develop new proof techniques to extend several properties of concurrent games with ω-regular objectives to concurrent games with tail objectives. We prove the positive limit-one property for tail objectives, that states for all concurrent games if the optimum value for a player is positive for a tail objective Φ at some state, then there is a state where the optimum value is 1 for objective Φ for the player. We show that the strategies for quantitative winning can be constructed from witnesses of strategies for qualitative winning. The results establish relationship between the quantitative and qualitative analysis of concurrent games *
Introduction
Stochastic games. Non-cooperative games provide a natural framework to model interactions between agents [15, 16] . A wide class of games progress over time and in stateful manner, and the current game depends on the history of interactions. Infinite stochastic games [18, 9] are a natural model for such dynamic games. A stochastic game is played over a finite state space and is played in rounds. In concurrent games, in each round, each player chooses an action from a finite set of available actions, simultaneously and independently of the other player. The game proceeds to a new state according to a probabilistic transition relation (stochastic transition matrix) based on the current state and the joint actions of the players. Concurrent games subsume the simpler class of turn-based games, where at every state at most one player can choose between multiple actions; and Markov decision processes (MDPs), where only one player can choose between multiple actions at every state. In verification and control of finite state reactive systems such games proceed for infinite rounds, generating a infinite sequence of states, called the outcome of the game. The players receive a payoff based on a payoff function that maps every outcome to a real number.
Objectives. Payoffs are generally Borel measurable functions [13] . For example, the payoff set for each player is a Borel set B i in the Cantor topology on S ω (where S is the set of states), and player i gets payoff 1 if the outcome of the game is a member of B i , and 0 otherwise. In verification, payoff functions are usually index sets of ω-regular languages. The ω-regular languages generalizes the classical regular languages to infinite strings, they occur in low levels of the Borel hierarchy (they are in Σ 3 ∩Π 3 ), and they form a robust and expressive language for determining payoffs for commonly used specifications [12] . The simplest ω-regular objectives correspond to safety ("closed sets") and reachability ("open sets") objectives.
Zero-sum games, determinacy and nonzero-sum games. Games may be zero-sum, where two players have directly conflicting objectives and the payoff of one player is one minus the payoff of the other, or nonzero-sum, where each player has a prescribed payoff function based on the outcome of the game. The fundamental question for games is the existence of equilibrium values. For zero-sum games, this involves showing a determinacy theorem that states that the expected optimum value obtained by player 1 is exactly one minus the expected optimum value obtained by player 2. For one-step zero-sum games, this is von Neumann's minmax theorem [21] . For infinite games, the existence of such equilibria is not obvious, in fact, by using the axiom of choice, one can construct games for which determinacy does not hold. However, a remarkable result by Martin [13] shows that all stochastic zero-sum games with Borel payoffs are determined. For nonzerosum games, the fundamental equilibrium concept is a Nash equilibrium [10] , that is, a strategy profile such that no player can gain by deviating from the profile, assuming the other player continue playing the strategy in the profile.
Qualitative and quantitative analysis. The analysis of concurrent zerosum games can be broadly classified into
• quantitative analysis that involves analysis of the optimum values of the games, and ε-optimal strategies that ensure values within ε of the optimum value; and
• qualitative analysis that involves the simpler analysis of the set of states where the optimum value is 1, and ε-limit-sure winning strategies that ensure satisfying the objective with value at least 1 − ε.
In general qualitative analysis of concurrent games is simpler as compared to quantitative analysis, as it only considers the case when the value is 1. Optimum values in concurrent games can be irrational even for reachability and safety objectives (with all rational transition probabilities) and hence quantitative analysis requires more involved analysis.
Properties of concurrent games. The result of Martin [13] establishes the determinacy of zero-sum concurrent games for all Borel objectives. The determinacy result sets forth the problem of study and closer understanding of properties and behaviors of concurrent games with different class of objectives. Several interesting questions related to concurrent games are: (1) relationship of qualitative and quantitative analysis; (2) characterizing ε-optimal strategies and ε-limit-sure winning strategies and their relationship; (3) relationship of zero-sum and nonzero-sum games. The results of [6, 7, 1] exhibited several interesting properties for concurrent games with ω-regular objectives specified as parity objectives. The result of [6] showed the positive limit-one property, that states if there is a state with positive optimum value, then there is a state with optimum value 1, for concurrent games with parity objectives. The positive limit-one property and establishing the relation of qualitative and quantitative analysis were key to develop algorithms and improved complexity bound for quantitative analysis concurrent games with parity objectives [1] . The above properties can often be the basic ingredients for the computational complexity analysis of quantitative analysis of concurrent games.
Outline of results.
In this work, we consider tail objectives, the objectives that do not depend on any finite-prefix of the traces. Tail objectives subsume canonical ω-regular objectives such as parity objectives and Müller objectives, and we show that there exist tail objectives that cannot be expressed as ω-regular objectives. Hence tail objectives are a strictly richer class of objectives than ω-regular objectives. Our result characterizes several properties of concurrent games with tail objectives. The results are as follows:
1. We show the positive limit-one property for concurrent games with tail-objectives. Our result thus extend the result of [6] from parity objectives objectives to a richer class of objective that lie in the higher levels of Borel hierarchy. The result of [6] follows from a complementation argument of quantitative µ-calculus formula. Our proof technique is completely different: it uses a novel strategy construction procedure and a convergence result from martingale theory. It may be noted that the positive limit-one property for concurrent games with Müller objectives follows from the positive limit-one property for parity objectives and the reduction of Müller objectives to parity objectives [20] . Since Müller objectives are tail objectives, our result presents a direct proof for the positive limit-one property for concurrent games with Müller objectives.
2. We establish connection between the complexity of strategies for quantitative winning (ε-optimality) and qualitative winning (ε-limit-sure winning) for tail objectives. We show that witnesses for strategies for quantitative winning can be constructed by composing witnesses of strategies that are qualitative winning in sub-games, and respect certain local conditions. 
Definitions
Notation. For a countable set A, a probability distribution on A is a func-
We denote the set of probability
δ consists of the following components:
• A finite state space S.
• A finite set Moves of moves.
• 
We denote by Λ i the set of all selectors for player i ∈ { 1, 2 }. A selector ξ is pure if for every s ∈ S there is a ∈ Moves such that ξ(s)(a) = 1; we denote by Λ P i ⊆ Λ i the set of pure selectors for player i. A strategy for player 1 is a function τ : S + → Λ 1 associates with every finite non-empty sequence of states, representing the history of the play so far, a selector. Similarly we define strategies π for player 2. A strategy τ for player i is pure if it yields only pure selectors, that is, is of type S + → Λ P i . A memoryless strategy is independent of the history of the play and depends only on the current state. Memoryless strategies coincide with selectors, and we often write τ for the selector corresponding to a memoryless strategy τ . A strategy is pure memoryless if it is pure and memoryless. We denote by Γ P , Γ M , Γ PM the family of pure, memoryless and pure memoryless strategies for player 1 respectively. Analogously we define the families of strategies for player 2. We denote by Γ and Π the set of all strategies for player 1 and player 2, respectively.
Once the starting state s and the strategies τ and π for the two players have been chosen, the game is reduced to an ordinary stochastic process. Hence, the probabilities of events are uniquely defined, where an event A ⊆ Ω s is a measurable set of paths. For an event A ⊆ Ω s , we denote by Pr τ,π s (A) the probability that a path belongs to A when the game starts from s and the players follows the strategies τ and π. For i ≥ 0, we also denote by Θ i : Ω s → S the random variable denoting the i-th state along a path.
Objectives. We specify objectives for the players by providing the set of winning plays Φ ⊆ Ω for each player. Given an objective Φ we denote by Φ = Ω \ Φ, the complementary objective of Φ. A concurrent game with objective Φ 1 for player 1 and Φ 2 for player 2 is zero-sum if Φ 2 = Φ 1 [17, 9] . A general class of objectives are the Borel objectives [11] . A Borel objective Φ ⊆ S ω is a Borel set in the Cantor topology on S ω . In this paper we consider ω-regular objectives [20] , which lie in the first 2 1 / 2 levels of the Borel hierarchy (i.e., in the intersection of Σ 3 and Π 3 ) and tail objectives which is a strict superset of ω-regular objectives. The ω-regular objectives, and subclasses thereof, and tail objectives are defined below. For a play ω = s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . ∈ Ω, we define Inf(ω) = { s ∈ S | s k = s for infinitely many k ≥ 0 } to be the set of states that occur infinitely often in ω.
• Reachability and safety objectives. Given a set T ⊆ S of "target" states, the reachability objective requires that some state of T be visited. The set of winning plays is thus Reach(
the safety objective requires that only states of F be visited. Thus, the set of winning plays is Safe(
• Büchi and coBüchi objectives. Given a set B ⊆ S of "Büchi" states, the Büchi objective requires that B is visited infinitely often. Formally, the set of winning plays is Büchi(
Given C ⊆ S, the coBüchi objective requires that all states visited infinitely often are in C. Formally, the set of winning plays is coBüchi(
• Parity objective.
is even }, and the Odd parity objective as
Informally we say that a path ω satisfies the parity objective, Parity(p), if ω ∈ Parity(p).
• Muller objective. Given a set M ⊆ 2 S , the Müller objective is defined as
• Tail objective. Informally the class of tail objectives are the class of objectives that are independent of all finite prefixes. An objective Φ is a tail objective, if the following condition hold: a path ω ∈ Φ if and only if for all i ≥ 0, ω i ∈ Φ, where ω i denotes the path ω with the prefix of length i deleted. Formally, let
An objective Φ is a tail objective if and only if Φ belongs to the tail σ-field T , i.e., the tail objectives are indicator functions of events A ∈ T .
The Müller and parity objectives are canonical forms to represent ω-regular objectives [14, 19] . Observe that Müller and parity objectives are tail objectives. Note that for a priority function p : V → { 0, 1 }, an even parity objective Parity(p) is equivalent to the Büchi objective Büchi(p −1 (0)), i.e., the Büchi set consists of the states with priority 0. Büchi and coBüchi objectives are special cases of parity objectives and hence tail objectives. Reachability objectives are not necessarily tail objectives, but for a set T ⊆ S of states, if every state s ∈ T is an absorbing state, then the objective Reach(T ) equivalent to Büchi(T ) and hence is a tail objective. It may be noted that since σ-fields are closed under complementation the class of tail objectives are closed under complementation. We give an example to show that the class of tail objectives are richer than ω-regular objectives. Values. The probability that a path satisfies an objective Φ starting from state s ∈ S, given strategies τ, π for the players is Pr τ,π s (Φ). Given a state s ∈ S and an objective, Φ, we are interested in the maximal probability with which player 1 can ensure that Φ and player 2 can ensure that Φ holds from s. We call such probability the value of the game G at s for player i ∈ { 1, 2 }. The value for player 1 and player 2 are given by the function
Example 1 Let r be a reward function that maps every state s to a realvalued reward r(s), i.e., r : S → R. For a constant c ∈ N consider the objective Φ c = 1 lim sup c defined as follows:
Note that the objectives of the player are complementary and hence we have a zero-sum game. Concurrent games satisfy a quantitative version of determinacy [13] , stating that for all Borel-objectives Φ, and all s ∈ S, we have 1 val (Φ)(s) + 2 val (Φ)(s) = 1.
A strategy τ for player 1 is optimal for objective Φ if for all s ∈ S we have
For ε > 0, a strategy τ for player 1 is ε-optimal for objective Φ if for all s ∈ S we have inf
We define optimal and ε-optimal strategies for player 2 symmetrically. For ε > 0, an objective Φ for player 1 and Φ for player 2, we denote by Γ ε (Φ) and Π ε (Φ) the set of ε-optimal strategies for player 1 and player 2, respectively. Note that the quantitative determinacy of concurrent games is equivalent to the existence of ε-optimal strategies for objective Φ for player 1 and Φ for player 2, for all ε > 0, at all states s ∈ S, i.e., for all ε > 0, Γ ε (Φ) = ∅ and Π ε (Φ) = ∅. We refer to the analysis of limit-sure winning states (the set of states s such that 1 val (Φ)(s) = 1) and ε-limit-sure winning strategies (ε-optimal strategies for the limit-sure winning states) as the qualitative analysis of objective Φ. We refer to the analysis of the values and the ε-optimal strategies as the quantitative analysis of objective Φ.
Positive Limit-one Property
The positive limit-one property for concurrent games for a class C of objectives states that for all objectives Φ ∈ C, for all concurrent games G, if there is a state s such that the value for player 1 is positive at s for objective Φ, then there is a state s where the value for player 1 is 1 for objective Φ. The property means if a player can win with positive value from some state, then from some state she can win with value 1. The positive limit-one property was proved for parity objectives in [6] and has been one of the key properties used in the algorithmic analysis of concurrent games with parity objectives [1] . In this section we prove the positive limit-one property for concurrent games with tail-objectives, and thereby extend the positive limit-one property from parity objectives to a richer class of objectives that subsume several canonical ω-regular objectives. Our proof uses a result from martingale theory and a novel strategy construction, whereas the proof for the sub-class of parity objectives [6] followed from complementation arguments of quantitative µ-calculus formula.
Notation. In the setting of concurrent games the natural filtration sequence (F n ) for the stochastic process under any pair of strategies is defined as
i.e., the σ-field generated by the random-variables Θ 1 , Θ 2 , . . . , Θ n . The proof of the lemma is available in Durrett (page 262-263) [8] . An immediate consequence of Lemma 1 in the setting of concurrent games is the following Lemma. Intuitively, the lemma means that the probability Pr τ,π s (1 A | F n ) converges almost-surely (i.e., with probability 1) to 0 or 1 (since indicator functions take values in the range { 0, 1 }). Note that the tail σ-field T is a subset of F ∞ , i.e., T ⊆ F ∞ , and hence the result of Lemma 2 holds for all A ∈ T . Proof. Assume towards contradiction that there exists a state s such that 1 val (Φ)(s) > 0, but for all states s we have 1 val (Φ)(s ) < 1. Since 2 val (Φ)(s ) = 1 − 1 val (Φ)(s ), we have 2 val (Φ)(s ) > 0, for all states s . Fix η such that 0 < η = min s∈S 2 val (Φ)(s). Let 0 < 2ε < min{ η, 1 val (Φ)(s) }. Fix an ε-optimal strategy τ ε for player 1. We define a sequence of strategies π i for player 2: let π 0 be an ε-optimal strategy for player 2. The strategy π i+1 is defined as follows. For a history s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s k we have 
Lemma 1 (Lévy's 0-1 law) Suppose H n ↑ H ∞ , i.e.,H n is a sequence of increasing σ-fields and H
∞ = σ(∪ n H n ). For all events A ∈ H ∞ we have E(1 A | H n ) = Pr(1 A | H n ) → 1 A almost-surely
Lemma 2 (0-1 law in concurrent games) For all events
A ∈ F ∞ = σ(∪ n F n ), for all strategies (τ, π) ∈ Γ × Π, for all states s, we have Pr τ,π s (1 A | F n ) → 1 A almost-surely,
Theorem 1 (Positive limit-one property)
Since τ ε is an ε-optimal strategy, we get that 1 val (Φ)(s) < ε. But by assumption, 2ε < 1 val (Φ)(s) and hence we have a contradiction. Thus the desired result is established.
Strategy Characterization for Tail Objectives
In this section we show that in concurrent games with tail objectives, witnesses for ε-optimal strategies can be constructed using witnesses for ε-limitsure winning strategies of sub-games, that respect certain local optimality conditions. The result characterizes the strategy complexity for quantitative optimality for tail objectives in terms of qualitative optimality and local optimality.
We relate the values of zero-sum games with tail-objectives with the Nash equilibrium values of nonzero-sum games with reachability objectives. The result shows that the values of a zero-sum game with complicated objectives can be related to equilibrium values of a nonzero-sum game with simpler objectives. We also show that for MDPs the value function for a tail objective Φ can be computed by computing the maximal probability of reaching the set of states with value 1. As an immediate consequence of the above analysis, we obtain a polytime reduction of the quantitative analysis of MDPs with tail objectives, to the qualitative analysis.
Local optimality. A key notion that will play an important role in the construction of ε-optimal strategies is the notion of local optimality. Informally, a selector function ξ is locally optimal if it is optimal in the one-step matrix game where each state is assigned a reward value 1 val (Φ)(s). A locally optimal strategy is a strategy that consists of locally optimal selectors. A locally ε-optimal strategy is a strategy that has a total deviation from locally-optimal selectors of at most ε. We note that local ε-optimality and ε-optimality are very different notions. Local ε-optimality consists in the approximation of a local selector; a locally ε-optimal strategy provides no guarantee of yielding a probability of winning the game close to the optimal one.
Definition 2 (Locally ε-optimal selectors and strategies)
A selector ξ is locally optimal for objective Φ if for all s ∈ S and a 2 ∈ Mv s (s) we have
We denote by Λ (Φ) the set of locally-optimal selectors for objective Φ. A strategy τ is locally optimal for objective Φ if for every history s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s k we have τ ( s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s k ) ∈ Λ (Φ), i.e., player 1 plays a locally optimal selector at every stage of the play. We denote by Γ (Φ) the set of locally optimal strategies for objective Φ. A strategy τ ε is locally ε-optimal for objective Φ if for every strategy π ∈ Π, for all k ≥ 1, for all states s we have Observe that a strategy that at each round i chooses a locally optimal selector with probability at least (1−ε i ), with ∞ i=0 ε i ≤ ε, is a locally ε-optimal strategy. We denote by Γ ε (Φ) the set of locally ε-optimal strategies for objective Φ.
We first show that for all tail objectives, for all ε > 0, there exist strategies that are ε-optimal and ε-locally optimal as well.
Lemma 3
For all tail objectives Φ, for all ε > 0,
Proof. For ε > 0, fix an ε 2 -optimal strategy τ for player 1. By definition τ is an ε-optimal strategy as well. We argue that τ ∈ Γ ε (Φ). Assume towards contradiction that τ ∈ Γ ε (Φ), i.e., there exists a player 2 strategy π, a state s, and k such that
Fix a strategy π * = (π + π) for player 2 as follows: play π for k steps, then switch to an ε 4 -optimal strategy π. Formally for a history s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n we have
where π is an ε 4 -optimal strategy. Since Φ is a tail objective we have
(since π is an ε 4 -optimal strategy).
Hence we have
Since by assumption τ is an ε 2 -optimal strategy we have a contradiction. This establishes the desired result. A value class of the game is the set of all states where the game has a given value. Reduction. We present a reduction from every value class VC(r) to a concurrent game G r and then establish a few key properties of the game G r . Let G = (S, Moves, Mv 1 , Mv 2 , δ) be a concurrent game with a tail objective Φ for player 1. For a state s we define the set of allowable actions as follows OptSupp(s) = {γ ⊆ Mv 1 (s) | such that there is an optimal selector ξ 1 ∈ Λ (Φ) and Supp(ξ 1 ) = γ}.
Definition 3 (Value class)
Consider a value class VC(r) with 0 < r < 1. We construct a concurrent game G r = ( S r , Moves, Mv 1 , Mv 2 , δ) as follows:
3. Transition function.
(a) The states w 1 and w 2 are absorbing states such that player 1 have value 1 and 0 at state w 1 and w 2 , respectively.
(b) Transition function at state s.
The above transition specifies that if for a move a 2 for player 2 and a move a 1 ∈ γ i for player 1, if the game G proceeds to a different value class with positive probability then in G r the game proceeds to the state w 1 , which has value 1 for player 1, with probability 1. Note, that since a 1 ∈ γ i and γ i ∈ OptSupp(s), if in G the game proceeds to a different value class with positive probability it also proceeds to VC >r with positive probability.
ii. For any move a 2 ∈ Mv 2 (s), if for every move a 1 ∈ γ i we have
where ξ 1 is an locally optimal selector with Supp(ξ 1 ) = γ i .
iii. For any move a 1 ∈ (Mv 1 (s) \ γ i ), for any move a 2 ∈ Mv 2 (s) we have:
Strategy maps. We define two strategy maps; t : Γ → Γ that maps a strategy in the game G to a strategy τ = t(τ ) in the game G r ; and t : Π → Π that maps a strategy in the game G r to a strategy π = t( π) in the game G.
The strategy maps are defined as follows:
1. Given a strategy τ in the game G the strategy τ = t(τ ) in the game G r is as follows:
2. Given a strategy π in the game G r the strategy π = t( π) in the game G is as follows:
where π is an arbitrary strategy Fact 1. It follows from the construction of the game G r that for all strategies τ ∈ Γ ε (Φ), for all states s ∈ S r \ { w 2 }, for all strategies π for player 2 we have Pr e τ ,e π e s (Reach({ w 2 })) ≤ ε; where τ = t(τ ).
Lemma 4 Let
Proof. Consider a strategy π in the game G r and let π = t( π). Since τ ε is an ε-optimal strategy and 1 val (Φ)(s) = r, we have Pr 
The Lemma follows.
Lemma 5 If
Proof. The argument is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. Assume towards contradiction that U 1 = ∅, U >0 = ∅, and let s ∈ U >0 . Fix 0 < 3ε < min{ r, 2 val (Φ)( s) }. Let π ε be an ε-optimal strategy for player 2. We construct a sequence of strategies τ i ε for player 1 as follows:
e., τ 0 ε is an ε-optimal and locally ε-optimal strategy in the game G (the fact that Γ ε (Φ) ∩ Γ ε (Φ) = ∅ follows from Lemma 3). Then τ 0 ε = τ 0 ε = t(τ 0 ε ).
The strategy τ i+1
ε is inductively defined as follows: Proof. To prove the desired result we show that U >0 = ∅. It follows from Lemma 5 that it suffices to show that U 1 = ∅. Fix 0 < 2ε < r, and let τ ε be a locally ε-optimal and ε-optimal strategy in G, i.e., τ ε ∈ Γ ε (Φ) ∩ Γ ε (Φ) (the fact that Γ ε (Φ) ∩ Γ ε (Φ) = ∅ follows from Lemma 3). Assume for the sake of contradiction that U 1 is non-empty. Let s ∈ U 1 and π ε be an ε-optimal strategy for player 2 from s. We construct a strategy τ ε for player 1 in G r and a strategy π ε for player 2 in G as follows:
1. Strategy τ ε in the game G r is defined as τ ε = t(τ ε ).
2. Strategy π ε in the game G is defined as π ε = t( π ε ).
Since τ ε is locally ε-optimal, we have Pr Hence we have Pr τε,πε s (Φ) ≤ ε. Since τ ε is an ε-optimal strategy and r > 2ε, and 1 val (Φ)(s) = r, we get a contradiction. Thus the desired result follows.
Definition 4 (Value-class qualitative ε-optimal strategy) For an objective Φ, for ε > 0, a strategy τ ε is a value-class qualitative ε-optimal strategy for a value-class VC(r), with 0 < r < Observe that the ε-limit-sure winning strategies in the game G r satisfies the requirement for value-class qualitative ε-optimal strategies for value-class VC(r). The existence of value-class qualitative ε-optimal strategies for tail objectives follows from Lemma 6.
Lemma 7 For all tail objectives
We denote by 
Proof. The results follows from the fact that the sequence ( 1 val (Φ)(Θ i )) i is a sub-martingale under τ ε and π. The following Lemma shows that the value-class qualitative ε-optimal strategies for different value classes can be "stitched" or composed together to produce an ε-optimal strategy. The key argument is as follows: if a play stays in S \ (W 1 ∪ W 2 ) then by properties of value-class qualitative ε-optimal strategies player 1 wins with probability 1; else the play reaches W 1 ∪ W 2 and then ε-optimality is guaranteed by local ε-optimality and Lemma 8. The details of the argument is similar to Lemma 14 in [1] .
Lemma 9 (Stitching Lemma) Let τ ε be a value-class qualitative ε-optimal strategy and τ ε is an ε-optimal strategy for all states in W 1 . Then τ ε is an ε-optimal strategy. Lemma 7, Lemma 9 and the characterization of value-class qualitative ε-optimal strategies as ε-limit-sure winning strategies in sub-games and locally ε-optimal strategies establishes the following Theorem. The Theorem states that witnesses for ε-optimal strategies can be constructed from witnesses of ε-limit-sure winning strategies in sub-games and locally ε-optimal strategies. 
Then τ ε is ε-optimal, i.e., τ ε ∈ Γ ε (Φ).
Zero-sum tail games and nonzero-sum reachability games. The above Lemma states that if the players play value-class qualitative ε-optimal strategies, for sufficiently small ε, then the play reaches W 1 ∪ W 2 with probability 1. Since value-class qualitative ε-optimal strategies are ε-optimal strategies (Lemma 9) the following lemma is immediate. Consider a non-zero sum reachability game G R such that the objectives of both players are reachability objectives: the objective for player 1 is Reach(W 1 ) and the objective for player 2 is Reach(W 2 ). Note that the game G R is not zero-sum in the following sense: there are infinite paths ω such that ω ∈ Reach(W 1 ) and ω ∈ Reach(W 2 ) and each player gets a payoff 0 for the path ω. We define ε-Nash equilibrium of the game G R and relate some special ε-Nash equilibrium of G R with the values of G. 
Lemma 11 Given a gamegraph

Definition 5 (ε-Nash equilibrium in
